E-LOGOS 2024, 31(1):35-46 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.505
Demystifying Consciousness: A Non-Reductive Framework
- Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Ghana
The phenomenon of consciousness has proved to be a notoriously convoluted concept, inviting various fields of philosophical inquiry to comprehend. In discourse on philosophy of mind, there are contentious perceptions on the elusiveness of consciousness; whether it is a reductive concept, a non-reductive concept or the easier way out, eliminating any mental language and substituting it with scientific language. This paper, by studying David Chalmers’ invaluable submissions on consciousness, provides a non-reductionist framework that will set the direction of the attempts by psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers to comprehend consciousness. To begin with, Chalmers’ arguments for the fundamental nature of consciousness will be discussed. Furthermore, it juxtaposes Chalmers’ assertions with the reductionist approach by the sciences. Having articulated these two perspectives regarding consciousness, a framework for theorizing consciousness is put forward.
Keywords: consciousness, dualism, materialism, reductive, supervene.
Received: March 24, 2024; Revised: March 24, 2024; Accepted: August 20, 2024; Prepublished online: August 25, 2024; Published: August 31, 2024 Show citation
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